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T he new chemical plants built in the 1950s and 1960s were larger than earlier ones andoperated at higher temperatures and pressures. The result was an increase in seriousaccidents. This led to the more systematic and technical approach to safety, known as
loss prevention. Its distinguishing features include the quanti cation of risk, the identi cation
of hazards by Hazop, audits, inherently safer design, more thorough investigation of incidents,
better incident reports and the study in much greater depth than before of explosions, runaway
reactions and the dispersion of leaks. New techniques such as Hazop were adopted more
quickly than inherently safer design which needs a fundamental change in the design process.
Signi cant papers, both the seminal ones that introduced new ideas and the evangelical ones
that spread them, are listed. Finally, the present status of loss prevention is summarized.
Keywords: accident investigation; Hazop; history; inherently safer design; loss prevention;
quantitative risk assessment.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1950s and 1960s a new generation of chemical plants,
larger than those built before and operating at higher
temperatures and pressures, was commissioned. The result
was an increase in serious leaks,  res and explosions,
illustrated by the graph of ICI’s worsening fatal accident
rate (Figure 1). The industry realized that safety could no
longer be left to elderly foremen and retired army of cers
and responded by paying greater attention to loss preven-
tion. As a result, although the size of the industry doubled
during the 1970s, the number of incidents killing  ve or
more people was unchanged. In ICI the improvement was
dramatic (see graph).
This paper describes the major changes that were made
and draws attention to the publications which were most
in uential in bringing them about. Most of them were both
seminal and evangelical– that is, they introduced new ways
of thinking about safety and they spread the message. The
ideas described in them usually circulated in the authors’
organizations for several years before publication and were
often discussed unof cially at symposia.
The earliest paper referenced was published in 1968 and
most of the others were published in the following decade–
the golden age of loss prevention. Before the late 1960s
little systematic thought had been given to technical safety
issues. Once technically quali ed people, used to looking
at problems in a systematic and quantitative way, moved
into safety they saw problems to be tackled wherever
they looked. Any reasonably able and systematic person
could hardly fail to make improvements. Working in loss
prevention at the time one felt like a gold-miner picking up
nuggets from the ground, the nuggets representing lives
saved and injuries prevented as well as money. By the 1980s
the subject had matured; there was still much to be done but
it was a time for consolidation rather than innovation. In the
1990s the growth of computer control and information
technology and growing interest in inherently safer design
has brought some new opportunities and new problems
but it is too soon to see whether any of the papers produced
will become classics.
My quali cations for writing this paper are that I was
appointed in 1968 as one of ICI’s  rst technical safety
advisers, an unusual appointment at the time for someone
with my background (seven years in research and sixteen
in production management), and was able to play a part in
the development of loss prevention.
WHAT IS LOSS PREVENTION?
As Frank Lees points out in his monumental Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries1, loss prevention
differs from the traditional safety approach in several ways:
· There is more concern with those accidents that arise
out of the technology.
· There is more emphasis on foreseeing hazards and taking
action before accidents occur.
· There is more emphasis on a systematic rather than a trial
and error approach, particularly on systematic methods of
identifying hazards and of estimating the probability that
they will occur and their consequences.
· There is concern with accidents that cause damage to
plant and loss of pro t but do not injure anyone, as well as
those that do cause injury.
· Traditional practices and standards are looked at more
critically.
There are some forms of loss which are not usually
considered part of loss prevention– for example, operating
below maximum ef ciency or taking too long over a shut-
down. This may not seem very logical but is accepted
practice. In the United States loss prevention is sometimes
used to describe the prevention of losses from theft,
vandalism and  re.
Loss prevention can be applied in any industry, especially
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highly technical ones, but the term, and the approach, have
been particularly widely used in the oil and chemical
industries. Loss prevention in these industries is a synonym
for process safety.
There is, of course, an overlap between loss prevention
and traditional or ‘hard hat’ safety but investigating the
reasons why a relief valve lifted, for example, is not usually
considered one of the responsibilities of a traditional
safety of cer.
I do not wish to imply that loss prevention is more
important or worthwhile than the traditional safety
approach. Both are needed and they complement each
other. Far more people are killed and injured, even in the
high technology industries, by simple mechanical acci-
dents than by the technology.
WHEN DID LOSS PREVENTION START?
People like to pick on a particular incident as marking
the start of a new era; they like to turn a prolonged process
into an instantaneous event. Thus the Industrial Revolu-
tion is said to have started in Ironbridge, now a place of
pilgrimage, in January 1709 when Abraham Darby smelted
iron with coal for the  rst time. Events suggested as
marking the start of loss prevention are the  rst Manchester
Hazards conference in 1960, the  rst American Institute of
Chemical Engineers annual loss prevention symposium
in 1967 and the  rst European conference on loss preven-
tion held in Newcastle in 1971. In fact, loss prevention
developed during the 1960s as a response to an increased
number of  res and explosions and a worsening fatal
accident rate, as already discussed.
The following sections describe the main features of loss
prevention and list those papers which were most in uen-
tial in bringing about change. Reading them, rather than
secondary sources, may encourage today’s engineers to
produce new ideas. Many papers, rightly and necessarily,
 ll the gaps in our knowledge but we may forget that new
approaches are also needed. I am embarrassed to quote
several of my own papers but, by a providential accident,
I was in the right place at the right time and was able to
learn from many colleagues and pass on the messages.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
This is discussed in detail elsewhere2 but is so central to
loss prevention that it cannot be avoided here. It was soon
realized, by myself and others, that we could not do
everything at once and that we needed a systematic and
defensible method of deciding priorities, of deciding what
to do now and what to leave alone, at least for the time
being. We used what we called hazard analysis or Hazan,
now more often called quantitative risk assessment (QRA).
We estimated the risk to life and used it as a criterion.
Risks above a certain level were reduced as a matter of
priority; those below the level were left alone3,4. Michael
Stewart’s paper4 describes a protective system of nuclear
complexity, designed to reduce the risk from the manu-
facture of ethylene oxide to a negligible level.
The early Hazans considered only risks to employees.
A paper by E.H. Siccama5, though not well-known– it was
seminal rather than evangelical– was the  rst to propose
target risks for the public at large. He suggested that the
targets used for  xing the heights of storm dykes in
The Netherlands should be used to decide whether or not
the risks from a Dutch chemical factory were acceptable.
Many other authors followed up the approach.
An early and in uential example of QRA was a paper
by Gordon Sellers6 which set standards for chlorine leaks
of various severities. It describedwork carried out following
a chlorine leak. A harmless smell was considered accept-
able once per year; a more severe escape which could cause
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Figure 1. ICI’s fatal accident rates (the number of fatal accidents in 108working hours or in a group of 1000 men in a working lifetime) expressed as a  ve-
year moving average, for the period 1960–1982. (From Hawksley, J. L., 1984,Proceedings of the CHEMRAWN III World Conference (CHEMical Research
Applied to World Needs), The Hague, 25–29 June 1984, Paper 3.V.2.)
some degree of distress and damage to vegetation was
considered acceptable once per decade;  nally, a major
emission which could lead to injury or risk to life outside
the plant should not occur more often than once per century.
Figures were quoted to show that these risks were small
compared to other risks of daily life which were accepted
without complaint. Today, twenty-three years later, we
would call the risks tolerable rather than acceptable and
might well ask for higher standards (we certainly would
if the risks were nuclear). This paper was evangelical rather
than seminal as the basic concepts were described in an
earlier paper by Arthur Dicken7.
QRA was accepted readily in the UK, by the Factory
Inspectorate and later by the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE), as UK law has long accepted that we do not have
to remove every hazard but only make the risks ‘as low as
reasonably practicable’ (ALARP). We weigh in the balance
the size of the risk and the cost of reducing it, in money,
time and trouble. If there is a gross disproportion between
them, the risk being insigni cant compared with the cost,
we do not have to reduce it. QRA was thus seen as a
extension of ALARP. In many countries, including the
US, there was no similar law and companies were for a
long time reluctant to admit that were not doing everything
possible to remove every hazard, however small in
consequences or unlikely to occur. The HSE’s booklet
on the Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations8
gives a clear description of the principles of QRA and
suggests realistic targets. It sets two levels of risk: an
upper one above which risks should not be tolerated and a
lower one below which they are ‘broadly acceptable’. The
ALARP region lies in between; risks should be reduced, so
far as reasonably practicable, using cost-bene t analysis
(Figure 2).
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDIES
We soon realized that the biggest source of error in
hazard analysis was failing to recognize all the hazards or
all the ways in which they could occur. Time was wasted
quantifying with ever greater accuracy the risks we had
identi ed while bigger risks went unseen. The biggest errors
came before Equation 1.
To identify hazards we used hazard and operability
studies (Hazops), developed in ICI from 1963 onwards.
The  rst paper was presented by Herbert Lawley in 1973
and published in 19749. It aroused interest from the start
and his detailed example of Hazop has been quoted in many
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Figure 2. Levels of risk. (Reproduced by permission of the Health and Safety Executive.)
other publications. The Chemical Industries Association
later published a booklet on Hazop which was widely
used10.
AUDITS
Safety auditing in the UK, as a formal activity, dates back
to the publication of two Chemical Industries Association
reports, in 196911 and 197312, prepared after visits to the
United States. The  rst one said, ‘Accident prevention is
just as much an aspect of ef cient operation as any other
activity. Yet many managers still tend to look askance at
suggestions that their company’s safety and loss prevention
measures should be subjected to regular scrutiny and, where
necessary, constructive criticism.’ The second report gave
practical advice on how to go about it.
We have come a long way since then. Safety audits are
now widely practised though there is a tendency in some
companies to audit the more traditional safety activities
rather than the loss prevention ones.
INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN
None of the ideas introduced in loss prevention has been
more fundamental than this and perhaps for that reason it
has been adopted more slowly than all the others men-
tioned in this paper. Though it was mentioned in passing in
earlier papers, the  rst paper devoted to the subject appeared
in 197813. It was inspired by an earlier paper and by an
event. The earlier paper was N.A.R. Bell’s classic paper on
the intensi cation of nitroglycerine production14, one of the
best examples of avoiding a hazard by greatly reducing
the inventory of hazardous material. The event was the
explosion at Flixborough in 1974. The conversion in
the plant, a stage in the manufacture of nylon, was low,
6% per pass. Most of the feed had to be recovered and
recycled many times and the inventory in the plant was
therefore large and so was the leak and the explosion. The
of cial report15 and most of the early commentators
failed to see that the best way to prevent another similar
explosion would be to reduce greatly the inventory in the
plant. This is not easy in the Flixborough process and
the one company that started a research programme soon
abandoned it as it could see no case for a new plant in
the foreseeable future.
However, the leak at Bhopal ten years later was
different. The material that leaked and killed over 2000
people was an intermediate, not a product or raw material.
It was convenient to store it but not essential to do so.
Afterwards many companies substantially reduced their
stocks of hazardous intermediates, often eliminating them
altogether by using the intermediates as soon as they were
made. Instead of 50 or 100 tonnes in a tank there was only
a few kg in a pipeline. There was increased interest in
inherently safer designs.
Recent surveys16 have shown that most safety and loss
prevention engineers are familiar with the concept of
inherently safer design, that most design and production
engineers have heard of it but do not realize its full potential
while most senior managers are unaware. It will not be
adopted until they become aware as it needs a fundamental
change in the design process: more time in the earlier stages
of design to consider alternatives.
Hazard analysis, valuable as it is, is a second best option.
We should  rst see if we can avoid the hazard.
LEAKS, EXPLOSIONS AND BLEVES
In parallel with the activities already described there
was an increased interest in the causes, consequences and
prevention of leaks, explosions and BLEVEs. In retrospect
it seems (and to some people at the time it seemed) that
consequences got more than their fair share of attention.
If we had taken more interest in causes and methods of
prevention, we could perhaps have worried less about
consequences.
The following were some of the most in uential papers:
· A paper by J.E. Troyen and R.Y. Levine17 was
descriptive rather than theoretical: reverse  ow from a
reactor to an ethylene oxide tank led to a runaway reaction
and a devastating explosion. The paper drew attention to
and increased our understanding of the hazards of ethylene
oxide, vapour cloud explosions and reverse  ow.
· A paper by W.C. Brasie and D.W. Simpson18was widely
quoted and was for many years the standard text for
estimating explosion damage.
· A paper by R.A. Strehlow19was one of the  rst and most
widely used texts on the theory of vapour cloud explosions.
· A paper by J. D. Reed20 on the effect of venting a vessel
containing lique ed ammonia was the  rst to draw atten-
tion to the fact that when the pressure on a lique ed gas
is released the loss of liquid is much greater than would
be expected from a heat balance as the escaping vapour
entrains much or all of the remaining liquid.
· The development of satisfactory methods for esti-
mating the spread of vapour clouds came somewhat later,
as a result of the trials organized by James McQuaid and
co-workers21.
· Experience showed the value of combustible gas
detectors for detecting leaks and of remotely-operated
emergency isolation valves for isolating them22.
· There was a change in the attitude towards runaway
reactions. No longer was it a defence to say that no-one
knew that the reaction mixture would go out of control if
it was kept too long or reaction conditions were varied.
Test methods were developed and people were expected
to use them. The Seveso runaway23 was partly responsible
for the change of attitude. Another milestone was an HSE
report24 on a process that had been used without incident
for seventeen years before there was an explosion in a
reactor which had been left standing for longer than usual.
The company had started to test all its processes by
accelerating rate calorimetry and HSE agreed that there
was no reason why they should have given this process
priority.
OTHER SYSTEMATIC METHODS
As well as hazard identi cation and QRA, systematic
methods were applied to many other activities, notably
the preparation of equipment for maintenance (including
entry to con ned spaces) and the modi cation of plants
and processes.
Preparation for maintenance was soon recognized as a
major cause of serious incidents. Sometimes methods were
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poor; sometimes they were satisfactory but not followed.
Individual incidents were described in many papers but
the  rst major publication on the subject was the Institution
of Chemical Engineers’ safety training package25, a
collection of notes and slides issued in the late 1970s and
based on an earlier ICI training programme. Unfortunately,
incidents due to poor methods or poor enforcement still
occur. Many engineers do not realize that issuing instruc-
tions is not enough; we have to convince people that there
is a need for them and then check that the message has
been received and the instructions are being followed. We
do not live in a society in which people will simply do as
they are told.
Flixborough drew attention to the need to control plant
modi cations and many companies introduced proce-
dures26. As with preparation for maintenance, they are not
always followed and incidents still occur. At  rst, attention
was concentrated on modi cations to equipment but it
was soon realized that modi cations to processes, such as
changes in temperature or concentration outside estab-
lished ranges, were equally important. Attention is now
being focused on changes in manning and organization.
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND
ACCIDENT REPORTS
The loss prevention adviser’s approach to accident
investigation differs from the traditional safety of cer’s in
several ways:
· More attention is paid to near-misses– that is, incidents
that could have injured people but by good fortune did not
do so– and to incidents that caused only damage to plant.
· The investigation is more thorough, looking not just
for immediate causes but for ways of avoiding the hazard
(such as inherently safer design) and for weaknesses in
management.
· There is more emphasis on the actions required to prevent
a recurrence than on causes we can do little about. The
report on a  re is more likely to suggest ways of preventing
a leak than look for sources of ignition (which half the time
are never found). Actions to remove opportunities for
human error are now more common than the statement,
‘Man told to be more careful’.
During the 1970s many company’s became more willing
to publish reports on accidents so that others could learn
from them. Examples were set by the American (later
Amoco) Oil Company, whose Process Safety Booklets
became widely available from 1955 onwards, and by ICI
Petrochemicals Division which circulated hundreds of
copies of its monthly Safety Newsletter to other companies
and organizations all over the world. Extracts were later
published in book form27. In 1975 the Institution of
Chemical Engineers introduced its Loss Prevention Bulletin
which published accident reports anonymously and many
detailed accident reports appeared in the annual volumes
of Loss Prevention (later replaced by Plant/Operations
Progress and then by Process Safety Progress), published
by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
Unfortunately, during the 1980s and 1990s there has been
less publication, not because of a deliberate decision to
publish less but because, as a result of downsizing, people
have less time to prepare articles for publication. In the US,
company lawyers have discouraged publication.
Publication is not, however, the complete answer. What
is published is soon read,  led and forgotten and the
accidents happen again, even in the same company and
the same plant as they occurred before. Organizations
have no memory; only people have memories and after
a few years they move on, taking their memories with
them28,29,30. I wish I could say that the situation is improving
but, if anything, as a result of downsizing and earlier retire-
ment, it is getting worse. It may therefore be worth
summarizing some of the actions that could be taken to
improve corporate memories:
· Include in every instruction, code and standard a note
on the reasons for it and accounts of accidents which would
not have occurred if the instruction, etc. had been followed.
· Never remove equipment before you know why it was
installed. Never abandon a procedure before you know why
it was adopted.
· Describe old accidents as well as recent ones in safety
bulletins and discuss them at safety meetings. ‘Giving the
message once is not enough.’
· Follow up at regular intervals to see that the recommen-
dations made after accidents are being followed, in design
as well as operations.
· Remember that the  rst step down the road to an accident
occurs when someone turns a blind eye to a missing blind.
· Include important accidents of the past in the training of
undergraduates and company employees.
· Devise better retrieval systems so that we can  nd, more
easily than at present, details of past accidents, in our own
and other companies, and the recommendations made
afterwards. We need (and it is being developed31) a
system that will use the information already entered for
other purposes to remind operators, designers and people
preparing permits-to-work of hazards they may over-
looked. The computer will be active and the human will
be passive.
WHY WERE SOME INNOVATIONS ADOPTED
MORE QUICKLY THAN OTHERS?
The obvious answer is because users thought they were
more valuable, but there is more to it than that. A more
important factor is the level in the organization that the
decision to adopt them can be taken; the lower the better.
In most companies Hazop and QRA did not start because
senior people took a decision to do so. More often,
individual project managers and design engineers decided
to try these techniques, they found them valuable, their
use spread and ultimately they became accepted practice
and company policy. Of course, this could happen only
where the senior managers and the company culture
encouraged trial and innovation but there was no need
for senior people to be directly involved.
Inherently safer design is different. New ideas are
always adopted more slowly than new techniques. ‘How
to’ books sell more copies than books on ideas which
discuss what we should do and why we should do it. As
already discussed, inherently safer design needs major
changes in outlook as well as changes in the design process
and these will not come about without the active involve-
ment of senior managers who, to a large extent, are unaware
of the concept, its scope and its bene ts. Many of them
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think that they have ful lled their safety duties when
they have seen the lost-time accident rate fall. However,
this provides no measure of the state of the process safety.
The serious leaks,  res and explosions mentioned in the
 rst paragraph of this paper occurred in companies that
had good lost-time accident rates.
A NOTE ON THE DRAMATIS PERSONAE
Some of the major players on the loss prevention stage
are not among the authors of the papers I have listed as
seminal. Nevertheless, their individual in uence was
greater than that of any of the authors I have listed. Frank
Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries32 is the
standard work on the subject and the output of Lees and
his co-workers is outstanding in both quality and quantity.
Jack Burgoyne’s published output is not large but his
in uence, through the Manchester Hazards conferences
and in other ways, is out of all proportion. Leslie
Bretherick’s Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards33
is another standard work which, like Lees’ book, is a
remarkable achievement for one person.
Amongst organizations the two that have contributed
the most to the development of loss prevention are the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and
the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE). We owe a
debt to the members of AIChE’s Loss Prevention Commit-
tee (since 1967) and to their Process Safety Center (since
1984) for their conferences and publications. To the
IChemE we are indebted for the Loss Prevention Bulletin
and the safety training packages, many of which now
include videos as well as slides. Their authors are too
numerous to mention but both the Loss Prevention Bulletin
and the packages owe much of their success to the
enthusiasm and energy of the late Bernard Hancock.
We must not forget the considerable contribution of the
Health and Safety Executive. Its Research Division (now
the Health and Safety Laboratory) and specialist staff
contributed much to the knowledge pool, their inspectors
encouraged the use of loss prevention techniques and
equipment and without the concept of ALARP the
development of QRA would have been inhibited.
THE RESULTS
According to Illidge et al.34, if ICI’s fatal accident rate
had continued at the 1970 rate (see Figure 1), the number of
employees killed in the period 1971–1998 would have
been about  fty more than the number actually killed. Other
major chemical companies are probably comparable (in
proportion to their size) and there will have been some
effect in smaller companies and in less responsible ones.
We can thus claim that the loss prevention movement
has prevented many hundreds of deaths, perhaps over a
thousand. The number of major injuries, those causing
serious and permanent injury, prevented is probably
comparable and, in addition, many other injuries and
much damage to plant have been prevented. During the
1970s the size of the chemical and oil industries roughly
doubled but the number of incidents killing  ve or more
people remained the same35.
Many, probably most, of the accidents that did occur
could have been prevented by using knowledge that was
available. Accidents do not, on the whole, occur because
we do not know how to prevent them but because we do
not use that knowledge. If a tenth, say, of the resources spent
on  nding new knowledge had been spent on spreading
existing knowledge (and  nding better ways of doing so),
more lives might have been saved.
Nevertheless, there has been a signi cant improvement.
But we should keep it in perspective. If some of the
resources devoted to loss prevention had been devoted to
discouraging smoking, many more early deaths would have
been prevented. There was, of course, no social mechan-
ism for transferring the resources and the loss prevention
specialists might not have been very good at this task.
Even so, we should not avoid the question, ‘Is Society
devoting too much effort to industrial safety compared with
the resources spent on disease, smoking, road accidents
and safety in the home?’
APPENDIX
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE TECHNIQUES
This appendix summarizes the present status of the
techniques and procedures already described and lists
sources of further information on present practice.
Hazop
Hazop has been more widely used than any of the
other techniques or procedures and has changed remarkably
little since the publicationof Lawley’s now classical paper9.
However, all techniques tend to degrade as they become
more widespread and there is concern that some companies
that claim to carry out Hazops are undertaking little more
than a perfunctory examination of the line diagrams.
Further reading:
Lees, F. P., 1996, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd edition,
Chapter 8 (Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, UK).
Kletz, T. A., 1999, Hazop and Hazan– Identifying and Assessing Process
Industry Hazards, 4th edition, Chapter 2 (Institution of Chemical
Engineers, Rugby, UK).
Knowlton, R. E., 1992, A Manual of Hazard and Operability Studies
(Chemetics International, Vancouver, Canada).
QRA
QRA has also been widely used but has been accepted
less readily than Hazop. At  rst it was used mainly for
in-plant problems involving instrumented systems for which
good failure data are available and there was little criticism
of such applications. When its use spread to estimates of
the effect on populations as a whole from factories as a
whole, uncertainties inevitably increased and some people
began to doubt its value. However, the estimates of relative
risks from alternative designs are more accurate than the
absolute values. Also, fault trees draw attention to those
failures which contribute most to the total risk, an essential
 rst step in risk reduction.
Further reading:
Kletz, T. A., 1999, Hazop and Hazan– Identifying and Assessing Process
Industry Hazards, 4th edition, Chapters 3–6 (Institution of Chemical
Engineers, Rugby, UK).
Lees, op.cit., Chapter 9.
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Pitblado, R. and Turney, R. (eds), 1996, Risk Assessment in the Process
Industries, 2nd edition (Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby,
UK).
Audits
Audits are widely practised but there is a tendency in
some companies to mechanically audit the same things year
after year while in other companies audits are one of the  rst
procedures to be cut when economies become necessary.
Procedures are subject to a form of corrosion more rapid
than that which affects the steelwork and can vanish without
trace once managers– at all levels– lose interest.
Further reading:
van Steen, J. (ed), 1996, Safety Performance Measurement (Institution
of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, UK).
Inherently Safer Design
Inherently safer design was introduced soon after Hazop
and QRA but knowledge of the concept and adoption of it
in practice have grown more slowly. As already mentioned,
Hazop and QRA were often adopted by individual design
engineers who thought them worth a try and found them
valuable; their use spread, became custom and practice and
was then enshrined in company procedures. Inherently safer
design, however, requires a change in the design process–
more time to consider alternatives– and encouragement
from the top. This cannot come about without the involve-
ment of senior managers who, by and large, are unaware
of the concept and indeed of process safety as whole.
Underlying this is perhaps, at this level, a lack of interest
in technical problems and a reluctance to innovate, two
of the problems of British industry.
Nevertheless, I remain convinced that inherently safer
design is an oak tree, which grows slowly but will last a
long time. (In contrast, during my time in industry, many
new techniques, introduced with a  ourish of trumpets,
were soon forgotten.)
Further reading:
Crowl, D. A. (ed), 1996, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes (American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, USA).
Kletz, T. A., 1998, Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer
Design, 2nd edition (Taylor & Francis, Philadelphia, PA, USA).
Kletz, T. A., 1999, The constraints on inherently safer design and other
innovations, Process Safety Progress, 18 (1): 64.
Leaks, Explosions and BLEVEs
Further reading:
Lees, op.cit., for most of the subjects discussed.
For dust explosions, see Eckhoff, R.F., 1991, Dust Explosions in the
Process Industries (Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, UK).
For runaway reactions, see Urben, P. (ed), 1995, Bretherick’s Hand-
book of Reactive Chemical Hazards, 5th edition (Butterworth-
Heinemann, London, UK) and Barton, J. and Rogers, R., 1997,
Chemical Reaction Hazards, 2nd edition (Institution of Chemical
Engineers, Rugby, UK).
Other Systematic Methods
Further reading on modications:
Sanders, R. S., 1999, Chemical Process Safety (Butterworth-Heinemann,
Newton, MA, USA).
Further reading on preparation for maintenance:
Grossel, S. S. and Crowl, D. A., 1995, Handbook of Highly Toxic
Materials– Handling and Management, Chapter 11 (Dekker, New
York, USA).
Accident Investigation
The standard is still very variable and on the whole less
thorough than it might be. Often only the immediate
technical causes are discussed and the underlying or root
causes are overlooked. For example, human error is often
listed as a cause and people told to take more care, or
to follow instructions more rigorously, but there is no
discussion of ways of reducing opportunities for human
error. The fault does not lie with the investigating teams,
who are close to the detail and interested mainly in the
immediate causes and the actions needed to overcome
them. The responsibility lies with the senior managers
who accept such reports without comment. Also, the
underlying causes are often de ciencies in the senior
management and we can hardly expect less senior people
to draw attention to them.
The actions needed to prevent us forgetting the lessons
of the past are discussed in the main text.
Further reading:
Kletz, T. A., 1994, Learning from Accidents, 2nd edition (Butterworth-
Heinemann, Oxford, UK).
Training
In the UK, though not elsewhere, all chemical engineer-
ing undergraduates receive some training in loss preven-
tion but inherently safer design is not always covered.
There are numerous courses for mature students includ-
ing many on Hazop and QRA. At the other extreme,
accident investigation, remembering the lessons of the
past and accident case histories are neglected. The last is
particularly unfortunate as case histories can grab our
attention and persuade us to take action. If we read advice
on the need, for example, to control modi cations, we
agree and forget. An account of Flixborough is more likely
to make us act.
General Further Reading
Lees, F. P., 1996, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd edition
(Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, UK).
The Handbooks published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety
of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
The Interactive Training Packages published by the Institution of Chemical
Engineers.
NOTE
Frank Lees died on 18 March while this issue of PSEP
was being prepared for publication. His contribution to loss
prevention was immense. His major achievement was his
monumental Loss Prevention in the Process Industries but
he carried out an extensive programme of research, trained
many students and wrote numerous papers. Despite failing
health, during the last few years he completed nine papers
now awaiting publication. He will also be remembered
for his contributions to the Advisory Committee on Major
Hazards, set up after the Flixborough explosion, and the
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Piper Alpha Inquiry. I owe a personal debt to him for giving
me the opportunity to carry on with my work after I retired
from industry. Like Perry, he will be remembered as long as
there is a process industry.
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